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Wireless ad hoc and sensor networks are infrastructureless systems with self-configuration 
capabilities. Neighbor discovery protocols are fundamental requirements in the construction 
of self-organizing networks. Each computer (node) must discover who its neighbors are in 
order to be able to coordinate with them for any later communication. This goal is usually 
accomplished through broadcasting methods in the initial phases of network deployment. 
 Along with the development of neighbor discovery protocols, security threats also 
introduced and some researchers discovered new forms of attacks for neighbor discovery 
scenarios. Authors in this field have given different definitions on what a neighbor is and to 
what extent an adversary is equipped. We will first clarify these differences by making some 
categorizations and definitions before proceeding to the introduction of attacks and 
solutions.  
 After the introduction of initial concepts, we classify the attacks into two general groups 
and explain the solutions for each of the groups numerating the pros and cons of them. We 
will review the current external attacks solutions for the neighbor verification problem first 
and start with the early simple methods which tried to defeat the relaying attacks (like the 
wormhole one) using distance estimation methods. This family of protocols relied on time 
stamps which needed tight clock synchronization among the nodes and was quite 
impractical in distributed networks specially the sensor ones. After that, we introduce the 
descendants of that family of protocols which resolved the clock synchronization problem 
by using challenge-response-like methods.  
 Then, the recent efforts on formal description of the time-based and time- and location-
based neighbor discovery protocols are explained. These researches led to the conclusion 
that time-based protocols can only secure the neighbor discovery under some strict 
conditions. Time- and location-based protocols are generally more secure than the time-
based ones alone.  
 Next, we will argue why all of these protocols are vulnerable to the internal attacks and 
introduce other methods for defeating internal adversaries. Describing the mostly 
cryptographic solutions in this domain, we outline their pros and cons. As we will see, 
almost all of these protocols are either unable to resist the invasion of an internal adversary 
equipped with both powerful transmitter and sensitive receiver, or need an initial setup 
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phase in which the network is assumed to be secure. Adding the lack of mobility support to 
the specifications of this family of solutions, we move on to present our solution for a special 
type of internal attack which statistically tries to block the sensitive broadcasting internal 
adversary in mobile dense networks. This approach works based on the inherent 
characteristics of the dense networks and only the medium access control protocol 
parameters are changed. Therefore, it imposes a very low cost to the system to create higher 
levels of robustness. 
 At the end a conclusion is made which suggests combinational methods to be employed in 
the neighbor verification protocols to achieve an acceptable level of security against both the 
internal and external attackers. 
 
1.1 Fundamental Concepts and Definitions 
In wireless ad hoc networks, computers (nodes) are usually stand-alone entities working in 
cooperation with each other in order to fulfill a desired task (Rubinstein et al., 2006). In such 
networks, nodes are located centimeters to hundred meters away from each other but can 
communicate through their wireless transceivers.  
 Sensor networks can be thought to be a subgroup of ad hoc networks with some specific 
characteristics. They are usually deployed (densely) in an area to sense or monitor quantities 
of desired form (Akyildiz et al., 2002). For example in a battlefield, enemy movements can 
be detected and localized by a distributed sensor network. Unlike the ad hoc networks, the 
messages created by sensor nodes are always destined to be received by a single target 
named “Sink”. The sensors cooperate to deliver the messages to the sink in a multi-hop 
manner.  
 The unattended nature of sensor networks and the high number of nodes creates some 
constraints for the designer. Each node must survive days or even years with a single source 
of power. Therefore, the protocols must not be too power consuming and should minimize 
both the amount of processing and the number of transmissions. The processing power and 
the amount of RAM1 and ROM2 of a sensor node are also quite limited. So, generally, 
designing a secure protocol is much harder in the sensor networks than in the ad hoc ones.  
 It is obvious that before a distributed cooperative network begins to work, nodes need to 
know their neighbors to form local structures. Any long-distance communication must be 
made in a multi-hop manner. The transmission radii of the nodes are limited and hence, 
each node should pass the messages to one/some of its neighbors in order to participate in 
the delivery of messages.  
 Neighbor discovery means determining whether a wireless device (node) is directly 
reachable without the assistance of any other device according to the predesigned rules of 
the network or not. Neighborhood can be unidirectional or bidirectional depending on 
whether only one side is able to deliver its messages to the other side or both sides are 
capable of doing so. 
 A neighbor-discovery attacker tries to deceivingly convince the nodes to believe that they 
are neighbors of a specific set of nodes (possibly including the adversary herself), when they 
are actually not. There are various types of attacks on neighbor discovery scenarios. The 
effectiveness level of an attack depends on whether the adversary is a part of the network or 
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not. In the next sub-section, we make some definitions on adversaries’ types and their level 
of capability.  
 
1.2 Types and Capabilities of Adversaries 
To describe the current solutions for the neighbor verification problem in the rest of this 
chapter better, we categorize them into two groups based on their resistance to internal 
(intrusive) or external (non-intrusive) attacks.  
 In external attacks the adversary is not able to compromise the nodes and hence, does not 
have access to the private information like the cryptographic keys and communication codes 
stored in the memory of the nodes whereas in the internal ones has (Khelladi et al., 2005).  
 Usually, an external attacker is only able to overhear (eavesdrop), relay (replay) or block 
(jam) the packets. On the other side, an internal attacker is capable of masquerading himself 
as a legal node and thus can imitate all the behaviors of a healthy node. Having the private 
cryptographic keys, she can even generate fake (but authenticated) messages to obtain a 
higher number of neighbors to what a traditional healthy node does. It is rather obvious that 
the second type of adversary is much more powerful than the first one.  
 
1.3 Effective Attacks on Neighbor Discovery 
In this part, we briefly introduce the currently known neighbor-discovery-related attacks in 
ad hoc and sensor networks. There are a few general attacks which have effects on neighbor 
discovery, and a few others which specifically address the neighbor-discovery-related 
issues.  
One of the oldest external passive attacks is eavesdropping. Regardless of the protocol 
architecture, an adversary is always able to overhear wireless communications. There is 
little chance for the designer to block eavesdropping. However keyed cryptographic 
operators (like the encryption ones) are quite useful in keeping the external adversaries from 
extracting sensitive information out of the transmitted signal (Zhu et al., 2006)(Du et al., 
2005)(Du et al., 2006). Neighbor discovery protocols are no exception. The protocol designer 
must seal the places where the information might leak during wireless transmissions.  
The active invasions that target the availability of network services are called Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks can be planned to work on any layer of the network 
protocol stack depending on how much weak that layer is. Jamming can be well categorized 
into the physical layer DoS attacks group. There are only a few non-perfect classic solutions 
like spread spectrum communication for this attack (Pickholtz et al., 1982). Other types of 
DoS attack also exist among which some try to excessively overload a badly designed 
protocol run on a resource-limited machine (Djenouri et al., 2005). So, one can easily 
conclude that in sensor networks, designing a DoS-resilient neighbor discovery protocol is 
more complicated than in ad hoc networks. Ignoring the heuristic solutions, the classic 
countermeasures for protocol-related DoS attacks are easy-to-compute checksums and 
ciphers that reject massive fake messages.  
Relaying and replaying are two other simple but powerful attacks (Papadimitratos et al., 
2008). In the replay attack, an adversary uses an old packet which was previously generated 
by a healthy node in order to deceive another healthy node in the future. To overcome this 
problem researchers have suggested using timestamps (in clock-synchronized networks) 
and nonces (Du et al., 2006)(Shokri et al., 2008).  
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designing a secure protocol is much harder in the sensor networks than in the ad hoc ones.  
 It is obvious that before a distributed cooperative network begins to work, nodes need to 
know their neighbors to form local structures. Any long-distance communication must be 
made in a multi-hop manner. The transmission radii of the nodes are limited and hence, 
each node should pass the messages to one/some of its neighbors in order to participate in 
the delivery of messages.  
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whether only one side is able to deliver its messages to the other side or both sides are 
capable of doing so. 
 A neighbor-discovery attacker tries to deceivingly convince the nodes to believe that they 
are neighbors of a specific set of nodes (possibly including the adversary herself), when they 
are actually not. There are various types of attacks on neighbor discovery scenarios. The 
effectiveness level of an attack depends on whether the adversary is a part of the network or 
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architecture, an adversary is always able to overhear wireless communications. There is 
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operators (like the encryption ones) are quite useful in keeping the external adversaries from 
extracting sensitive information out of the transmitted signal (Zhu et al., 2006)(Du et al., 
2005)(Du et al., 2006). Neighbor discovery protocols are no exception. The protocol designer 
must seal the places where the information might leak during wireless transmissions.  
The active invasions that target the availability of network services are called Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks can be planned to work on any layer of the network 
protocol stack depending on how much weak that layer is. Jamming can be well categorized 
into the physical layer DoS attacks group. There are only a few non-perfect classic solutions 
like spread spectrum communication for this attack (Pickholtz et al., 1982). Other types of 
DoS attack also exist among which some try to excessively overload a badly designed 
protocol run on a resource-limited machine (Djenouri et al., 2005). So, one can easily 
conclude that in sensor networks, designing a DoS-resilient neighbor discovery protocol is 
more complicated than in ad hoc networks. Ignoring the heuristic solutions, the classic 
countermeasures for protocol-related DoS attacks are easy-to-compute checksums and 
ciphers that reject massive fake messages.  
Relaying and replaying are two other simple but powerful attacks (Papadimitratos et al., 
2008). In the replay attack, an adversary uses an old packet which was previously generated 
by a healthy node in order to deceive another healthy node in the future. To overcome this 
problem researchers have suggested using timestamps (in clock-synchronized networks) 
and nonces (Du et al., 2006)(Shokri et al., 2008).  
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Relaying attacks are harder to detect. The adversary relays the healthy nodes’ packets 
instantaneously (either at the physical layer or in a store-and-forward manner) in another 
part of the network. Wormhole attack is a well-known representative of this family. In the 
wormhole (tunneling) attack, two (or more) adversarial nodes try to transfer information 
through a dedicated channel between themselves and then use it in another part of the 
network (Hu et al., 2006). This attack can be implemented both by internal and external 
adversarial nodes. In the external form, they simply relay the packets either in a store-and-
forward manner or instantaneously at the physical layer. In the internal form, they also have 
the opportunity to alter the packet contents intelligently before forwarding.  
Every neighbor discovery protocol is composed of a series of packet transmissions. In a 
weak protocol, these attacks can be launched to relay neighbor discovery packets to other 
areas of the network, in order to convince distant nodes to believe that they are true 
neighbors. Figure 1 shows two healthy nodes A and B, and two adversarial nodes C and D. 
A and B cannot see each other directly since their transmission radii (shown with circles 
around them) are small compared to their distance. However, C and D can relay the 
neighbor-discovery-related packets to create a virtual link.  
 
 Fig. 1. The wormhole attack: Two adversarial nodes C and D, relay the packets between 
healthy nodes A and B, to deceivingly convince them to believe that they are in the vicinity 
of each other 
 
Hello flooding is a broadcast-type attack that was originally designed for sensor networks 
(Karlof et al., 2003). However, its concept can be adopted in the ad hoc networks too. Most 
of the neighbor discovery protocols (as well as the routing protocols) use a broadcasted 
packet called “Hello” or “Beacon” to announce a node’s presence to its neighbors. Nodes 
receiving this message assume that the sending node is one of their neighbors. An internal 
attacker can launch a hello flooding attack by simply broadcasting the hello message with 
very high power. This way she tries to convince a lot of nodes that she is one of their 
neighbors and the victims add her to their table of neighbors. If the adversary is well 
equipped, she might even have a low noise sensitive receiver which enables her to receive 
distant weak signals and thus turn this attack into a bidirectional one. Figure 2. shows the 
adversarial and healthy transmission ranges.  
This attack was initially designed for the internal attackers. However a simple repeater-like 
external adversary can also launch a similar attack through boosting a healthy node’s 
transmission power and acting as a “man in the middle”. Fortunately, as we will see, there 
are more solutions for the external threats than the internal ones. 
 
 Fig. 2. A broadcast-type attack (hello flooding) diagram in a network with regular 
transmission range of r. The adversary (A) transmits messages with high power pretending 
to be a neighbor of B whereas she is actually R meters away (R>r) 
 
Broadcast attacks can also be implemented in routing protocols in the route discovery phase 
(e.g. Routing Request (RREQ) message broadcasting) to shorten the adversary’s path to the 
destination and thus putting her into most of the routes. 
 
2. Neighbor Discovery External Attacks Countermeasures  
If the maximum transmission range of a healthy node is r, then a secure neighbor discovery 
protocol must reject any claiming neighbor farther than this distance. The most challenging 
threat in designing externally resistant neighbor discovery protocols is the wormhole (or 
relaying) attack and the easiest way to block this attack is estimating the distance between 
the nodes. 
The very early methods of neighbor verification relied on the round trip propagation time 
(RTT) measurement to estimate the approximate distance between two nodes and compare 
it with a maximum allowable value. Brands et al. were pioneers in using this method with 
their one-bit exchange proposal (Brands et al., 1993). The distance bounding method they 
proposed was a cryptographic protocol that put an upper-bound on the distance between 
two users (nodes for example) and did not let the protocol be manipulated. This scheme was 
able to resist man-in-the-middle like attacks, however, Singelee et al. later claimed that 
Brands’ scheme is unable to stop what they called “terrorist fraud attack” which is an 
internal attack in our terminology (Singelee et al., 2005). After the introduction of distance 
bounding concept, similar protocols with names like “Echo protocol“ (Sastry et al., 2003) 
appeared which were all based on the same basic idea of round trip time measurement.  
 In (Hu et al., 2003), to prevent wormhole attacks in ad hoc networks, a method called 
“packet leashes“ was introduced and an idea similar to the signal trip delay measurement 
was repeated. The authors proposed two types of methods which could resist the (external) 
wormhole attacks: geographical leashes and temporal leashes. Geographical leashes fall into 
the category of time-and-location based protocols which we will introduce in the next parts. 
However, it does not actually use the timing data directly. It assumes that the sender sends 
its location (with the maximum relative error equal to �) along with the timestamp showing 
the transmission time (with a maximum relative error of ∆). If the nodes move with a 
maximum speed of �, then this method gives an upper bound on the distance which is 
found by � � �|���� � ����|� � ����� � ��� � �.  
The authors also proposed a time-based approach which they called “temporal leashes”. In 
this approach the transmission time is (authentically) written in the packet and the receiver 
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The authors also proposed a time-based approach which they called “temporal leashes”. In 
this approach the transmission time is (authentically) written in the packet and the receiver 
www.intechopen.com
Trends in Telecommunications Technologies698
 
can then decide on the distance from the duration of signal flight. To authenticate the 
timestamp (and location in the previous part), digital signatures and the hash-chain-based 
(tree) authentication methods have been used. However the original idea comes from 
TESLA authentication method (Perrig et al., 2000).  
Regardless of the protocol types, for both parties to be able to measure the distance, each 
must have the chance to challenge the other. So, at least three messages must be exchanged. 
For unidirectional neighbor discovery, exchanging two messages suffices (Sayad et al.,2008). 
Korkmaz addressed the RTT measurement, focusing on the difference of signal propagation 
speed in the healthy nodes and adversaries’ channels (Korkmaz, 2005). In this method, a 
combination of power and delay-related criteria has been used. The simplified diagram of 
Korkmaz protocol is depicted in Figure 3. Here, “M“ is an authenticated request message 
and “ACK“ is its reply containing ��� , ��� and ���� � ����  which is the processing delay in B.  
 Fig. 3. Korkmaz’s neighbor discovery protocol 
 
 If the worst case signal propagation speed between two nodes with distance R is s, and the 
maximum speed of signal propagation in the adversaries‘ media is vadv (vadv>s), then the 
upper and lower bound estimates of the RTT are found as [ ������ , ��� �. Any claiming neighbor with measured RTT lower than ������ is accepted while anyone with a RTT larger than ���  is rejected. Not all the measurements which fall in this interval are accepted. If the actual 
speed of signal propagation in the network is x, then Korkmaz proposes using a hard 
decision making threshold for the RTT samples falling in the abovementioned interval. The 
following formula normalizes the measured RTT. 
 �� � ��� ������� � ������                                                                  (1)  
 The hard decision making threshold is the acceptable level of confidence i.e. for �� � �� we assume that the two nodes are neighbors and for �� � �� we assume they are not. This threshold is equivalent to an effective distance ���� � ���/� � ����/� � �/�����. Obviously, 
this distance can be either smaller or larger than R. So this type of decision making is always 
prone to either rejecting correct neighbors or accepting some incorrect ones which opens a 
vulnerability window for the system. To mitigate this flaw, Korkmaz proposed to combine 
the RTT-measurement-based method with a power-measurement-based one. Generally, the 
relationship between the distance, transmitted and received signal strengths is: 
 � � ����������                                                              (2) 
 
where k and n are constants and are determined by the characteristics of channel and 
communicating devices. Since the ACK message contains the measured power fields, A can 
easily compute the distance (d) using equation (2). However, since k and n fluctuate in the 
real world scenarios it is proposed to verify the following equilibrium instead: 
 ������ � ������                                                                  (3)  
Korkmaz claims that if the nodes are not actual neighbors i.e. they communicate through 
relaying adversaries, then the values of ���  and ��� will be altered depending on the transmission power used during relaying and the distance between the adversaries and 
legitimate nodes, and hence, the above equilibrium does not hold. However, it can be easily 
verified that if the relaying adversaries collaborate with each other, this countermeasure is 
easily neutralized. For example in Figure 1, if C tells D to send the signal received from A, to 
B with the same power she received (and vice versa), then  eq. (2) is satisfied. Also it should 
be emphasized that this method only addresses probabilistic security facing external attacks. 
Obviously B, as an internal attacker can deceive A if she lies about the processing time.  
As an alternative approach, a few authors suggested searching for graph abnormalities to 
detect the relaying attackers either in a distributed or centralized manner. Maheshwari et al. 
proposed a distributed geometrical algorithm to search for graph abnormalities in wireless 
networks (Maheshwari et al., 2007). The core idea of their work was to find impossible cases 
which do not occur in healthy graphs. If two nodes are claimed not to be neighbors then the 
number of their independent neighbors (those neighbors of the two nodes who cannot see 
each other) is quite limited. For example consider Figure 4 in which two healthy nodes a and 
b are at their farthest possible range of neighborhood. In this case, the nodes which are 
considered to be neighbors of both of them can only be found in the intersection of the two 
coverage areas (the hatched area). Mashewari et al. have proved that no more than two 
independent neighbors can be found in the hatched area in this case. So if a third common 
neighbor comes in, then it must be covered by one of the previous common neighbors. The 
number of independent common neighbors decreases even more when the two nodes 
further move away from each other. So if the adversaries launch a wormhole attack like the 
one in Figure 5, then two independent nodes a and b which are far from each other, will 
have three common independent neighbors e, f and g and according to the argument we 
made there can be no more than two common independent neighbors in this case and hence, 
a fraud has been detected.  
 
 Fig. 4. Mashewari et al.‘s diagram to demonstrate the maximum number of independent 
common neighbors of two nearly independent nodes 
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 Fig. 3. Korkmaz’s neighbor discovery protocol 
 
 If the worst case signal propagation speed between two nodes with distance R is s, and the 
maximum speed of signal propagation in the adversaries‘ media is vadv (vadv>s), then the 
upper and lower bound estimates of the RTT are found as [ ������ , ��� �. Any claiming neighbor with measured RTT lower than ������ is accepted while anyone with a RTT larger than ���  is rejected. Not all the measurements which fall in this interval are accepted. If the actual 
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the RTT-measurement-based method with a power-measurement-based one. Generally, the 
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 Fig. 4. Mashewari et al.‘s diagram to demonstrate the maximum number of independent 
common neighbors of two nearly independent nodes 
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 Fig. 5. A sample wormhole attack which is detected by Mashewari et al.‘s forbidden 
structure search 
 
However this was a simple example and the authors have extended this one-hop graph-
based idea to a k-hop one to obtain a higher wormhole attack detection probability.  
In a combined work of distance measurement and graph abnormality detection, Shokri et al. 
proposed what they called a practical secure neighbor verification protocol for sensor 
networks (Shokri et al., 2008). The core idea of their measurement part contribution relies on 
having two different transceivers (one Radio Frequency (RF) and one Ultra Sonic (US)) 
which is a bit similar to the echo protocol approach (Sastry et al., 2003). Since the sensors 
have simple processors of microsecond clock pricision, the RF transceiver is used for clock 
synchronization-like purposes (or simply measuring the difference of time). Distance 
measurement with RF signals requires a nanosecond clock precision. So the RTT 
measurement (and consequently the distance measurement) is done more accurately using 
the slow-propagating US signals with the precision at hand.  
This method is actually composed of three smaller sub-protocols. Assuming that all pairs of 
the nodes already have a symmetric shared key (like ��� between A and B), each initiating 
node A, sends a request message to (arbitrary) node B over the RF channel. B replies to this 
request with another message. Then A broadcasts a message through its ultrasonic 
transmitter to reveal its nonce whose hash was previously sent at the request transmission 
phase. This is similar to the delayed authentication methods (like TESLA method (Perrig et 
al., 2000)) which bind the authenticity of the next step to the previous one. At last an ACK is 
sent to each of the candidates (like B). The whole message exchange of sub-protocol 1 is 
depicted in Figure 6. Notice that ���� � denotes an encryption with key K, and ��� and �� 
are two nonces. ������ � means that the whole message is protected with a message authentication code under key K. Node B‘s side times are measured with its own clock 
which is not necessarily synchronized with A. At the end of this phase, B can compute its 
distance to A using ���� � �� �����,�′ � ����,� � �����,�′ � ����,��� where � is the speed of slowly 
propagating ultrasonic signal.  
 After this stage, the nodes exchange their local table of distances as the second step of the 
protocol so that each obtains a local view of the network topology. At the third stage, each 
node starts to run a series of tests on the information obtained in the previous stages. First of 
all, a node eliminates those links with distances outside the acceptable range. Second, the 
symmetry of the links is verified meaning that an arbitrary node A checks the ��� � ��� equaility for any candidate B. Third, for any claiming neighbor, the testing node tries to find 
two other candidates in the table and then, knowing the distances between them, it assumes 
hypothetical (but wisely selected) positions for these three candidates so that the triangular 
inequalities hold for each possible set of three nodes (including itself). At last, it verifies 
 
whether the four nodes form a convex quadrilateral3 or not. The authors have shown that 
the above criteria, prevent wormhole attacks with two colluding adversaries and also resist 
well facing wormhole attacks with more than two adversaries. 
 
 Fig. 6. The sub-protocol 1 (distance measurement) of Shokri et al.’s method 
 
Although Shokri’s protocol has novel contributions and combined many ideas like delayed 
authentication and geometrical tests, it suffers from some design flaws. In an 
infrastructureless wireless network, neighbor discovery is the first protocol which is run i.e. 
there is no information about the existence of the nearby nodes prior to starting the protocol. 
So there are no agreed mutual cryptographic keys and hence A cannot send authenticated 
messages to a node like B which is not even known to be in its vicinity. Sensor nodes are 
extremely resource-limited devices and in a network with thousands of sensors, it is 
practically impossible to store a large number of symmetric keys in a node’s memory and 
this has been a challenging security problem thus far (Chan et al., 2003)(Du et al., 2005)(Zhu 
et al., 2003 & 2006). Using LEAP (Zhu et al., 2003) or LEAP+-like (Zhu et al., 2006) key 
distribution methods selected by the authors, is problematic since these protocols 
themselves have neighbor discovery protocols in their initial setup phase and static 
networks do not need multiple-time independent neighbor discoveries. Besides, LEAP+ 
itself is capable of blocking wormhole attacks after the key establishment phase. With a 
rather high number of message transmissions (which includes the hidden stage of table 
exchanges) and a high number of link verification computations, this solution is not very 
energy conserving. Also the use of two transceivers (RF and US) is in contradiction to the 
basic assumption in sensor networks design which is cost effectiveness. It should be 
mentioned that this protocol is unidirectional in our terminology and is designed to prevent 
external wormhole attacks in static networks, thus has limited functionality facing internal 
attackers and also in highly mobile networks. However, compared to the older centralized 
approaches for graph abnormality detection (Rasmussen et al., 2007), both of the 
abovementioned distributed approaches are valuable.  
                                                                 
3A convex quadrilateral with four vertexes A, B, C and D is characterized by 
 ൫�ܤሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൈ ܤ�ሬሬሬሬሬԦ൯൫ܤ�ሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൈ �ܦሬሬሬሬሬԦ൯൫�ܦሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൈ ܦ�ሬሬሬሬሬԦ൯൫ܦ�ሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൈ �ܤሬሬሬሬሬԦ൯ � � 
www.intechopen.com
Neighbor Discovery: Security Challenges in Wireless Ad hoc and Sensor Networks 701
 
 Fig. 5. A sample wormhole attack which is detected by Mashewari et al.‘s forbidden 
structure search 
 
However this was a simple example and the authors have extended this one-hop graph-
based idea to a k-hop one to obtain a higher wormhole attack detection probability.  
In a combined work of distance measurement and graph abnormality detection, Shokri et al. 
proposed what they called a practical secure neighbor verification protocol for sensor 
networks (Shokri et al., 2008). The core idea of their measurement part contribution relies on 
having two different transceivers (one Radio Frequency (RF) and one Ultra Sonic (US)) 
which is a bit similar to the echo protocol approach (Sastry et al., 2003). Since the sensors 
have simple processors of microsecond clock pricision, the RF transceiver is used for clock 
synchronization-like purposes (or simply measuring the difference of time). Distance 
measurement with RF signals requires a nanosecond clock precision. So the RTT 
measurement (and consequently the distance measurement) is done more accurately using 
the slow-propagating US signals with the precision at hand.  
This method is actually composed of three smaller sub-protocols. Assuming that all pairs of 
the nodes already have a symmetric shared key (like ��� between A and B), each initiating 
node A, sends a request message to (arbitrary) node B over the RF channel. B replies to this 
request with another message. Then A broadcasts a message through its ultrasonic 
transmitter to reveal its nonce whose hash was previously sent at the request transmission 
phase. This is similar to the delayed authentication methods (like TESLA method (Perrig et 
al., 2000)) which bind the authenticity of the next step to the previous one. At last an ACK is 
sent to each of the candidates (like B). The whole message exchange of sub-protocol 1 is 
depicted in Figure 6. Notice that ���� � denotes an encryption with key K, and ��� and �� 
are two nonces. ������ � means that the whole message is protected with a message authentication code under key K. Node B‘s side times are measured with its own clock 
which is not necessarily synchronized with A. At the end of this phase, B can compute its 
distance to A using ���� � �� �����,�′ � ����,� � �����,�′ � ����,��� where � is the speed of slowly 
propagating ultrasonic signal.  
 After this stage, the nodes exchange their local table of distances as the second step of the 
protocol so that each obtains a local view of the network topology. At the third stage, each 
node starts to run a series of tests on the information obtained in the previous stages. First of 
all, a node eliminates those links with distances outside the acceptable range. Second, the 
symmetry of the links is verified meaning that an arbitrary node A checks the ��� � ��� equaility for any candidate B. Third, for any claiming neighbor, the testing node tries to find 
two other candidates in the table and then, knowing the distances between them, it assumes 
hypothetical (but wisely selected) positions for these three candidates so that the triangular 
inequalities hold for each possible set of three nodes (including itself). At last, it verifies 
 
whether the four nodes form a convex quadrilateral3 or not. The authors have shown that 
the above criteria, prevent wormhole attacks with two colluding adversaries and also resist 
well facing wormhole attacks with more than two adversaries. 
 
 Fig. 6. The sub-protocol 1 (distance measurement) of Shokri et al.’s method 
 
Although Shokri’s protocol has novel contributions and combined many ideas like delayed 
authentication and geometrical tests, it suffers from some design flaws. In an 
infrastructureless wireless network, neighbor discovery is the first protocol which is run i.e. 
there is no information about the existence of the nearby nodes prior to starting the protocol. 
So there are no agreed mutual cryptographic keys and hence A cannot send authenticated 
messages to a node like B which is not even known to be in its vicinity. Sensor nodes are 
extremely resource-limited devices and in a network with thousands of sensors, it is 
practically impossible to store a large number of symmetric keys in a node’s memory and 
this has been a challenging security problem thus far (Chan et al., 2003)(Du et al., 2005)(Zhu 
et al., 2003 & 2006). Using LEAP (Zhu et al., 2003) or LEAP+-like (Zhu et al., 2006) key 
distribution methods selected by the authors, is problematic since these protocols 
themselves have neighbor discovery protocols in their initial setup phase and static 
networks do not need multiple-time independent neighbor discoveries. Besides, LEAP+ 
itself is capable of blocking wormhole attacks after the key establishment phase. With a 
rather high number of message transmissions (which includes the hidden stage of table 
exchanges) and a high number of link verification computations, this solution is not very 
energy conserving. Also the use of two transceivers (RF and US) is in contradiction to the 
basic assumption in sensor networks design which is cost effectiveness. It should be 
mentioned that this protocol is unidirectional in our terminology and is designed to prevent 
external wormhole attacks in static networks, thus has limited functionality facing internal 
attackers and also in highly mobile networks. However, compared to the older centralized 
approaches for graph abnormality detection (Rasmussen et al., 2007), both of the 
abovementioned distributed approaches are valuable.  
                                                                 
3A convex quadrilateral with four vertexes A, B, C and D is characterized by 
 ൫�ܤሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൈ ܤ�ሬሬሬሬሬԦ൯൫ܤ�ሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൈ �ܦሬሬሬሬሬԦ൯൫�ܦሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൈ ܦ�ሬሬሬሬሬԦ൯൫ܦ�ሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൈ �ܤሬሬሬሬሬԦ൯ � � 
www.intechopen.com
Trends in Telecommunications Technologies702
 
Poturalski et al., in a series of evolutionary papers and technical reports, tried to classify 
neighbor discovery protocols into two generic time-based and time-and-location-based 
classes and provide systematic rules to formally verify the security of these protocols against 
external attacks (Poturalski et al., 2007) (Poturalski et al., 2008). In their initial technical 
report, they formally derived a so-called impossibility result for the time-based neighbor 
discovery protocols stating that it is impossible for a neighbor discovery protocol which 
solely relies on signal propagation time measurements to provide seamless security 
(Poturalski et al., 2007). Figure 7 demonstrates the “impossibility result“ informally. If the 
maximum allowable distance of two healthy neighbors is r, then the maximum signal travel 
time would be r/s where s is the speed of signal propagation in the channel. If two nodes 
cannot reach each other directly, either due to a large distance (Figure 7c) or a barrier 
(Figure 7b) then one or more relaying adversaries can deliver the messages and as long as 
the time of signal flight is less than r/s, this relay will not be detected. However, if the 
imposed delay of a relay is more than r/s (i.e. ∆������r/s) then time-based protocols can 
become secure. It is also shown that designing secure time-and-location based protocols is 
possible since the receiving nodes have the sender’s location (in an authentic manner carried 
by the message) and compute the valid distance themselves and then compare it with the 






Fig. 7. There is no possibility for B (or A) to always distinguish between these three paths in 
a propagation time measuring protocol as long as the propagation delay does not exceed r/s. 
vadv is the signal propagation speed in the adversaries‘ channel which is higher than s. 
 
Later, each of the two classes of protocols proposed by Poturalski et al., was divided into 
two groups; Beacon (B) and Challenge/Response (CR) protocols (Poturalski et al., 2008). In 
B-protocols, a node broadcasts some information without having the response of the other 
side. The receivers are supposed to add the sender to their list of neighbors after some 
processing and hence, this method is unidirectional. On the other side, CR-protocols 
support the minimum three-phase message exchange requirement for a bidirectional 
neighbor discovery. However the samples the authors have mentioned for the CR protocols 
are not really bidirectional (although they could be as in their original framework). In 
Poturalski’s examples, CR protocols create the chance of challenge for one side only, and all 
the other nodes must run the same protocol themselves to complete the neighbor discovery 
task.  
 
The authors claimed a secure neighbor discovery protocol is characterized with two 
properties: “correctness” i.e. if the protocol declares two nodes neighbors at some time, they 
must indeed be neighbors at that time, and “availability” meaning that if two nodes remain 
neighbors for some time (TP) then the protocol must detect this neighborship.  
 They defined seven types of events to describe their rules and protocols with. Table 1 
summarizes six of them which we will deal with, along with their description.  
 
Receive(A;t;m)  A receives the first bit of message m at t 
Bcast(A;t;m) A broadcasts message m at t 
Fresh(A;t;n) Nonce n is freshly generated by A at t 
Neighbor(A;t;B;C;t‘) At t, A declares B has been a neighbor of C at t‘(unidirectional) 
NDstart(A;t) A starts a neighbor discovery with all the nodes at t 
NDstart(A;t;B) A starts a neighbor discovery with B at t 
Table 1. Some of the events symbols and their description in Poturalski et al.‘s literature. 
 
Based on these definitions, they formally defined security requirements for the four possible 
groups of neighbor discovery protocols and presented a sample pseudo-code for each group 
satisfying those set of requirements. To unify the demonstrations, we have converted the 
codes to message diagrams. Figure 8 and Figure 9 show Poturalski’s sample protocols for 
beacon time-based (B/T) and beacon time and location-based (B/TL) neighbor discovery 
protocols respectively. In Figure 10 and Figure 11, challenge-response versions of these 
protocols are depicted. Notice that some of the messages in these figures are actually 
intended to be received by a single node. However to comply with the broadcast-type 
message transmission symbol shown in Table 1 (and in the pseudo codes), they are drawn 
with broadcast-like arrows.  
In all of these figures, len{.} stands for an operator giving the length of a message 
transmission (in seconds for example), r is a node regular transmission range and s is the 
signal propagation speed in the network communication channel.  
 
     Fig. 8. A beacon and time-based protocol pseudo code (B/T) 
 
 Fig. 9. A beacon and time-and-location-based protocol pseudo code (B/TL) 
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 Fig. 9. A beacon and time-and-location-based protocol pseudo code (B/TL) 
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 Fig. 10. A challenge-response time-based protocol pseudo code (CR/T) 
 
 Fig. 11. A challenge-response time-and-location-based protocol pseudo code (CR/TL) 
 
As we described in the previous parts, if there are no challenges and responses the 
adversaries can easily relay the broadcasted beacon packets to other parts of the network. 
Also notice that the protocols times are written from a third-party‘s point of view. In 
practice, B and A have time synchronization problems too, which even widens the 
vulnerability window more in beacon-based protocols. 
 In all of these sample protocols, nodes need to verify the authentication codes attached to 
the end of messages which in turn makes the protocols dependent on another key 
distribution protocol (involving either storage of all the keys in the memory of the nodes 
that makes it only suitable for ad hoc networks or employment of a key agreement protocol 
which inherently needs a neighbor discovery protocol itself). 
Regardless of these practical issues, each of these simplified representatives of neighbor 
discovery protocols has been proven to satisfy Poturalski’s mathematical security 
requirements under some specific conditions. Beacon time-based (B/T) protocols are secure 
if the adversary’s relaying delay is greater than or equal to �� ���. This is a rather obvious 
constraint since with less than this bound, the adversary can relay some messages without 
adding too much delay and keep the overall propagation and relaying delays below the 
acceptable threshold �� ��� (refer to Figure 7). It can also be verified that the availability 
 
property is also satisfied with TPB/T � ������A, t, MACA�t��� � �� ��� i.e. if two nodes remain neighbors for this amount of time (and the B/T neighbor discovery is started) then, this 
neighborship will be definitely detected by the protocol. Similarly, for a TL protocol to be 
secure, the designer must take a communication media whose signal propagation speed is 
close to the maximum possible speed in an adversary’s channel (or simply the light speed 
(s=c=vadv)). If less than this speed is used (i.e. vadv>s), even though A has both B‘s and its own 
locations, a pair of adversaries can simply launch the wormhole attack keeping the overall 
RTT equal to 2×distance(A,B)/s which is sufficient to satisfy the protocol criterion. The 
security conditions of other protocols can be found similarly. Table 2 summarizes the 
conditions under which each of the four groups of neighbor discovery protocols is secure.  
 
Protocol 
Type Security Constraints Applied 
B/T 1. ∆������ �� ���2. TPB/T=len{IDA,t,MACA(t)}+ �� ��� 
CR/T 1. ∆������ ��� ���2. TPCR/T=len{IDB,n}+len{MACB(n)}+ ��� ��� 
B/TL 1. ∆������ �
2. � � ����3. TPCR/TL=∞ (depending on distance) CR/TL Table 2. Conditions for each class of neighbor discovery protocols to support Poturalski’s 
formal description of security requirements 
 
We investigated some of the main external-attack-related researches and the positive and 
negative aspects of them in this section. In the next section we focus on the internal attacks' 
countermeasures which are different from the previous methods in nature and mostly are 
cryptographic solutions. 
 
3. Neighbor Discovery Internal Attacks Countermeasures  
There are a few internal attacks affecting the performance of neighbor discovery protocols. 
Needless to say some of the external attacks have the internal form too. For example, in a 
wormhole attack, two internal relaying adversaries can even alternate the packet contents in 
order to deceive healthy entities. Unfortunately compared to the external attacks described 
in the previous section, the number of these attacks is not limited at all. This is because these 
attacks are more related to the protocol-specific features than the nature of neighbor 
discovery. As there are many variants for each neighbor discovery protocol family, the 
internal attacks are also numerous. However, there are a few common attacks that can 
conceptually cover some of these threats, and, among them, broadcast attacks are more 
outstanding. 
Almost all the algorithms which use a broadcasted data are susceptible to being invaded by 
the broadcast-type attackers. In the sensor networks hello flooding case, a loud 
advertisement can convince many surrounding nodes that the adversary is one of their 
neighbors. This attack can be launched in the routing algorithms too e.g. the adversary can 
rebroadcast the received RREQ packet with high power to be a part of the best routes to the 
destination with a high probability. Notice that unlike the previous part, in internal attacks, 
www.intechopen.com
Neighbor Discovery: Security Challenges in Wireless Ad hoc and Sensor Networks 705
 
 Fig. 10. A challenge-response time-based protocol pseudo code (CR/T) 
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destination with a high probability. Notice that unlike the previous part, in internal attacks, 
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the adversary is a legitimate node i.e. a node is captured and compromised by an adversary 
and all of its cryptographic keys and private information are known to the adversaries. 
Broadcast attacks had been previously addressed with different names somewhat but Karlof 
and Wagner were the first who introduced this attack specially in sensor networks (Karlof et 
al., 2003). Consider a simple form of neighbor discovery in which a well-equipped internal 
(legitimate) adversary tries to broadcast a packet called hello (beacon) and every node that 
hears this packet adds the sender to its neighbors list. Since one side of the protocol which 
sends the authenticated messages is adversary herself, it is impossible to rely on either time 
or location information given by the other party. So generally to defeat an internal attacker 
every node must rely on its own data. The same argument holds true for the CR protocols. If 
the adversary gives false (but authenticated) location information to the other party, then 
colluding with other relaying adversaries she can easily bypass the normal security 
checkpoints. 
As a solution for the broadcast-type attacks, Karlof et al. proposed to verify bidirectionality 
of the links (Karlof et al., 2003). They assumed that the adversary has a high-power 
transmitter but an ordinary receiver and thus is unable to capture distant weak signals. If 
the receiver (B) sends valuable information in reply to the broadcasted message (hello), on 
which the adversary (A) must rely for future communications, then she will be defeated 
since she cannot hear B. The initial raw idea of verifying bidirectionality of the links was not 
developed much by the authors, however, it was mentioned that this countermeasure is 
useless if the adversary has both a high-power transmitter and a sensitive receiver.  
 In sensor networks, some authors then tried to limit the nodes communication ranges 
through cryptographic methods (Du et al., 2005)(Lin et al., 2005)(Zhu et al., 2006). The early 
methods, tried to pre-load a large number of pairwise keys in each node’s memory (key pre-
distribution). But for sensor networks, this was an impractical solution since the amount of 
memory each sensor has is quite limited. Probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes were 
proposed to solve this problem. In these methods, after the deployment, every node tries to 
find some common keys with its neighbors through a so-called mutual key discovery 
protocol (Eschenauer et al., 2002). However these solutions had problems too. The common 
key discovery was itself another protocol which was needed to be secured. Besides 
probabilistic approaches do not always guarantee providing a common key. So another 
approach was adopted which was letting the nodes themselves establish the keys after 
deployment (Lin et al., 2005)(Zhu et al., 2006). This implies the use of a negotiation protocol 
between the nodes when they are deployed. It is rather obvious that to protect these 
negotiations against external attackers the messages must be encrypted with some key and 
since the mutual keys are not known at this phase yet, usually a pre-loaded global key is 
used.  
A general assumption made by these methods is that compromising a node takes time but to 
stop an attacker who can capture and compromise the nodes, the whole negotiation should 
not take more than Tmin seconds. To prevent further attacks, nodes themselves delete the 
global key from their memory after Tmin seconds. 
Secure Cell Relay (SCR) is one of the distributed key establishment/routing protocols which 
resists broadcast attacks (Lin et al. 2005)(Du et al., 2006). It uses a three-way handshake 
protocol to avoid the unidirectional link problem. There are two versions of this protocol but 
the most recent one in which the location information has also been used is depicted in 
 
Figure 12. In this figure, � is the global shared key, EK the encrypting operator, and N0 is a 
nonce. ��௕ is defined as the B’s broadcast key and ��� is the private key between A and B 
used for later communications. At the end of this process, B adds A to its neighbors list and 
stores ��� and ��௕ in a table for the future. After completion of the protocol for every node, 
all the nodes delete the global key form their memory. 
 
 Fig. 12. Secure Cell Relay (SCR) neighbor discovery protocol message diagram 
 
But SCR neighbor discovery protocol is weak in many aspects. The use of time stamps forces 
the designer to somehow maintain a synchronized clock which is problematic in distributed 
networks. Besides with a good design, in a three-phase message exchange protocol, both 
nodes can add each other to their neighbors list because both of the parties had the chance to 
challenge the other one. However, SCR messages need to be modified to provide this 
feature. Also notice that after erasing the global key �, there is no chance for a node to 
update its neighbors list. This property makes the protocol unsuitable for mobile scenarios. 
LEAP (Zhu et al., 2003) and then LEAP+ (Zhu et al., 2006) are key distribution protocols for 
sensor networks which also block the broadcasting adversary. The main goal of LEAP+ was 
to create four sets of keys for each node; one set of pairwise keys for inter-neighbor 
communications, one key for local broadcasting, one globally-shared network key and one 
key to communicate with the sink. As the local broadcast key is made from the local 
pairwise keys and dealing with the attack the two others are not needed, we only focus on 
the construction of pairwise keys.  
Here again the assumption of an adversary-free immune network after the initial 
deployment is necessary. So we assume that for an interval which is at least Tmin seconds 
there is no internal attacker present in the network. To prevent external attacks during this 
period, there is a globally shared key pre-loaded into memory of the nodes.  
 If fk is a one-way keyed pseudo-random function (like encryption operators) with key k, 
then the pairwise key construction in LEAP+ can be summarized as shown in Figure 13.
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   Fig. 13. The simplified form of key establishment in LEAP+ protocol at the initial 
deployment phase 
 
“A” finds the pairwise key by computing ��� � �݂ಳ�ܫܦ�� where ��  is found by applying the global key to the one-way function with B’s ID as the input argument (�� � �݂�ܫܦ��). Once 
this process is done for every node, the global key is erased from the memory along with �� . After the pairwise key establishment phase, all the communications are done in an 
encrypted manner with the previously generated keys. Since the adversary is supposed to 
capture a node not sooner than Tmin seconds, she is unable to send meaningful messages to 
nodes farther than the communication range of a normal node. So, broadcast attacks are 
thwarted this way. Also, the adversary cannot make new pairwise keys anymore since the 
required global key is missing in the memory of the captured node.  
Although this protocol performs well in terms of resource consumption and complexity, it 
has drawbacks too. A closer look at the protocol reveals that B’s presence in this challenge-
response-like protocol is not as strong as it should be. The only role of B is announcing its 
presence by sending back its ID. It does not even generate any random number to maintain 
the freshness of the key. Although it has been assumed that the network is devoid of any 
internal adversaries for at least Tmin seconds (since for example it takes at least Tmin seconds 
to intrude into a tamper-resistant device memory), this is not a valid assumption for the 
external ones. If external adversaries are present before the nodes deployment, they are able 
to launch relay-based attacks which simply means, in the above protocol, B could be a 
relayed distant node. After Tmin seconds, the adversary intrudes into A’s memory and at the 
end, she has a large-range communication capability for which she had planned before. It is 
also obvious that due to the erasure of the global key after Tmin seconds, nodes are unable to 
restart the neighbor discovery protocol in the future and thus, this protocol does not support 
mobility. Any mobility-supporting security framework must allow periodical updates of the 
neighbors list. This implicitly involves participation of either time or a random number 
(nonce) in the protocol to block replay attacks. The authors have virtually limited the range 
one node can communicate in, through cryptographic methods. With the erasure of global 
key (and the static network the authors assumed) the probable future neighbor discoveries 
are limited to the detection of lost connections due to power depletions or failures. 
In (Sayad et al., 2008), as an alternative solution, especially in sensor networks in which 
broadcast attacks are more devastating, we proposed a probabilistic robust design 
framework for the internal broadcast attacks which has a very low complexity and can even 
be combined with any other secure neighbor discovery protocol. To define a probabilistic 
robustness, we shall first differentiate three general attack profiles.  
 
 Fig. 14. (A) An optimal secure neighbor discovery protocol broadcast attack profile (B) An 
unprotected neighbor discovery protocol broadcast attack profile (C) A broadcast attack-
resilient neighbor discovery profile   
 
As shown in Figure 14., facing broadcast-type attacks, the behavior of neighbor discovery 
protocols can be categorized into three different profiles. When the transmission power of a 
node or sensor increases, the number of neighbors is also increased (conforming with the 
different transmission ranges nodes have based on their available power resources), but if 
the power of a node goes beyond a threshold corresponding to the maximum allowable 
transmission range, then these three family of protocols behave differently. Regarding the 
broadcast attacks, type A profile is the desired optimal secure neighbor discovery protocol 
i.e. if an adversary tries to increase her power in order to obtain more neighbors, she will not 
succeed. Complex cryptographic solutions may be put in this group.  
Type B profile shows the performance of an unprotected neighbor discovery protocol. The 
adversary’s payoff increases as its power goes up. In type C which is actually the focus of 
our work, the maximum payoff (possible number of neighbors) of the adversary is not as 
low as an optimal secure solution but definitely bounded. In this approach, the designer 
tries to simplify the protocol in expense of losing some (but not all) of the security. This is a 
general framework however and the amount of penalty paid for simplicity depends on the 
designer’s approach. It is worth mentioning that the initial parts of all these three profiles 
are similar, because as long as an adversary’s behavior falls in the class of healthy nodes’ 
behavior, she receives the same amount of payoff as a normal node does. So, there is no 
instant solution which can decrease the payoff of an internal adversary to less than that of a 
healthy node. 
We propose that one can wisely manipulate Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol 
parameters to achieve a type-C resistivity against broadcast attacks in sensor networks 
without consuming too much energy. In a compromised network, when an adversary that is 
equipped with both powerful transmitter and sensitive receiver, broadcasts a hello-like 
request or beacon (hello flooding), a lot of nodes receive it almost simultaneously. In a two 
(or more) way handshake protocol, these nodes will start to compete to grab the channel 
and send the reply messages in order to announce their presence. Healthy nodes have small 
transmission and reception ranges. Therefore, roughly speaking, those nodes located farther 
than the carrier sense range of each other will try to send the reply messages back almost 
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simultaneously. The main idea is to tune the channel access and transmission parameters so 
that the responses of these distant nodes collide with each other at the adversary’s receiver 
due to the high density in arrival. If these reply messages contain valuable information 
which is vital for future communications, then as the adversary is unable to decode the 
reply messages correctly, she is obliged to reduce her power. This is somehow similar to the 
well-known hidden node effect in wireless ad hoc networks. Figure 15. shows the attacker 
and sample distant nodes colonies along with their corresponding transmission ranges. 
 
                        Fig. 15. Transmission ranges of normal and adversary nodes in Sayad et al.’s framework. 
Adversary’s high transmission power attracts many healthy nodes. However, far healthy 
nodes do not see each other and hence start to transmit reply packets simultaneously 
 
As in the neighbor discovery phase no infrastructure is already formed, a random channel 
accessing method is preferred. So one can expect that this approach would be a probabilistic 
one at the end. Although the design framework introduced is quite general, we give an 
instance protocol in which the notion of important information delivery in the reply packets 
transmission phase is contrived. The sample protocol in Figure 16 tries to establish a mutual 
key between the two nodes using Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (Diffie & Hellman, 
1976) while following the framework rules. 
 It should be noticed that neighbor discovery message collisions must be minimized in a 
healthy scenario i.e. since the only difference between healthy and adversary nodes is their 
transmission ranges, high-colluding protocol design for the adversary might also affect the 
normal behavior of the network and this is to be avoided. In our example, this leads to a 
trade-off problem.  
To make a demonstration of the above proposal’s efficiency, for channel accessing, IEEE 
802.15.4 WPAN standard was chosen (IEEE 802.15.4, 2006). However, some modifications 
were made to the protocol to adapt its neighbor discovery to the classic three-phase type, 
and the minimum and maximum back-off exponents were considered as the parameters to 
be tuned. With a node distribution density of 0.01 (1 node in 100m2), the attack profile for 
different values of the minimum back-off exponent is shown in Figure 17. 
As it can be clearly seen, this method behaves like a type-C attack-resistant protocol. With 
the maximum back-off exponent set to eight and the identical reply packets which were 
seven back-off periods long, the minimum back-off exponent was swept. With this 
configuration, the adversary’s payoff increases as the minimum back-off exponent goes up. 
 
 Fig. 16. An example of Sayad et al.‘s framework. Reply message includes a part of the 
common key which will be used for future communications 
 
 Fig. 17. The broadcast attack profiles on Sayad et al.‘s sample protocol. The adversary 
receives a negative feedback from the network in response to her greediness in obtaining 
more neighbors 
 
Notice that we also have to keep the healthy neighbor discovery scenario as intact as 
possible i.e. any profile closer to the intersection of the mean number of a healthy node’s 
neighbors line and the normal transmission range line is preferred. With a high minimum 
back-off exponent, the profile approaches the ideal point for healthy scenarios, however, the 
maximum (but still restricted) payoff of the adversary is also increased. Now it is up to the 
network designer to set how much security (with respect to the broadcast attacks) should be 
sacrificed for sake of gaining more efficiency. 
The abovementioned design framework is a concept which can be freely combined with the 
other neighbor discovery protocols and since it has a very low cost, is quite applicable in 
resource-limited sensor networks. Unlike the cryptographic methods (and many other 
www.intechopen.com
Neighbor Discovery: Security Challenges in Wireless Ad hoc and Sensor Networks 711
 
simultaneously. The main idea is to tune the channel access and transmission parameters so 
that the responses of these distant nodes collide with each other at the adversary’s receiver 
due to the high density in arrival. If these reply messages contain valuable information 
which is vital for future communications, then as the adversary is unable to decode the 
reply messages correctly, she is obliged to reduce her power. This is somehow similar to the 
well-known hidden node effect in wireless ad hoc networks. Figure 15. shows the attacker 
and sample distant nodes colonies along with their corresponding transmission ranges. 
 
                        Fig. 15. Transmission ranges of normal and adversary nodes in Sayad et al.’s framework. 
Adversary’s high transmission power attracts many healthy nodes. However, far healthy 
nodes do not see each other and hence start to transmit reply packets simultaneously 
 
As in the neighbor discovery phase no infrastructure is already formed, a random channel 
accessing method is preferred. So one can expect that this approach would be a probabilistic 
one at the end. Although the design framework introduced is quite general, we give an 
instance protocol in which the notion of important information delivery in the reply packets 
transmission phase is contrived. The sample protocol in Figure 16 tries to establish a mutual 
key between the two nodes using Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (Diffie & Hellman, 
1976) while following the framework rules. 
 It should be noticed that neighbor discovery message collisions must be minimized in a 
healthy scenario i.e. since the only difference between healthy and adversary nodes is their 
transmission ranges, high-colluding protocol design for the adversary might also affect the 
normal behavior of the network and this is to be avoided. In our example, this leads to a 
trade-off problem.  
To make a demonstration of the above proposal’s efficiency, for channel accessing, IEEE 
802.15.4 WPAN standard was chosen (IEEE 802.15.4, 2006). However, some modifications 
were made to the protocol to adapt its neighbor discovery to the classic three-phase type, 
and the minimum and maximum back-off exponents were considered as the parameters to 
be tuned. With a node distribution density of 0.01 (1 node in 100m2), the attack profile for 
different values of the minimum back-off exponent is shown in Figure 17. 
As it can be clearly seen, this method behaves like a type-C attack-resistant protocol. With 
the maximum back-off exponent set to eight and the identical reply packets which were 
seven back-off periods long, the minimum back-off exponent was swept. With this 
configuration, the adversary’s payoff increases as the minimum back-off exponent goes up. 
 
 Fig. 16. An example of Sayad et al.‘s framework. Reply message includes a part of the 
common key which will be used for future communications 
 
 Fig. 17. The broadcast attack profiles on Sayad et al.‘s sample protocol. The adversary 
receives a negative feedback from the network in response to her greediness in obtaining 
more neighbors 
 
Notice that we also have to keep the healthy neighbor discovery scenario as intact as 
possible i.e. any profile closer to the intersection of the mean number of a healthy node’s 
neighbors line and the normal transmission range line is preferred. With a high minimum 
back-off exponent, the profile approaches the ideal point for healthy scenarios, however, the 
maximum (but still restricted) payoff of the adversary is also increased. Now it is up to the 
network designer to set how much security (with respect to the broadcast attacks) should be 
sacrificed for sake of gaining more efficiency. 
The abovementioned design framework is a concept which can be freely combined with the 
other neighbor discovery protocols and since it has a very low cost, is quite applicable in 
resource-limited sensor networks. Unlike the cryptographic methods (and many other 
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described protocols), this framework supports (high) mobility of the nodes. Besides, in this 
approach, the limiting assumption about the initial adversary-free period of the network 
operation at the time of nodes deployment has been removed.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we introduced many of the current threats and solutions for the neighbor 
discovery problem in wireless ad hoc and sensor networks. Separating the attacks into 
internal and external ones, depending on how much the protocols are resistant to each of 
these attacks, we categorized them into two groups as well.  
Many of the current solutions focus on the external relay-based attacks while little effort has 
been made to mitigate the internal attackers’ damage. Most of the current solutions for the 
internal attacks are cryptographic which are either resource consuming or do not support 
mobility.  
Numerating all the solutions, we proposed a probabilistic countermeasure for the internal 
broadcast attacks. It is obvious that combinational attacks require combinational solutions. 
Our design framework for the internal broadcast attacks can be combined with nearly all the 
other solutions to provide higher levels of security facing both internal and external attacks.  
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